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TWA 800 (July 1996) 
Long History of Wire Failures 
Frayed Kapton@ wire in center tank area led to midair explosion of 747 (230 killed) 
3 other 747s were found with same fraying issue and grounded* 
SwissAir 111 (September 1998) 
Damaged wire in plane's entertainment system led to MD-11 crash in Atlantic Ocean (229 killed) 
STS-93 (July 1999) 
Short circuit in 14 AWG Kapton@ insulated wire 
Dreamliner 787 Test Flight ZA002 (October 2010) 
Electrical fault in P100 panel caused fire forcing emergency landing in Laredo, Texas 
* Flight Safety Foundation, Aviation Mechanics Bulletin, July 1998, page 6. 
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Types of Aircraft Wire Failures 
Investigations of those accidents and later examinations of other airplanes showed a 
collection of common problems. Deteriorated wiring, corrosion, improper wire 
installation and repairs, and contamination of wire bundles with metal shavings, dust, 
and fluids (which would provide fuel for fire) were common conditions in representative 
examples of the "aging fleet of transport airplanes." 
FAA Regulations on the certification and maintenance of aircraft wiring systems (FAA-2004-18379J 
Electrical wire failure on Airbus A380 
Thermal 
Mechanical Chemical 
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Wire Failures Modes 
INSTALLATION FAILURE 
The wire or cable was not installed correctly. 
Poor connector choice or incorrect connector installation. 
ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE 
The wire or cable is not intended for the place it is installed. 
Examples: Indoor-Outdoor cables; cable installed in interference areas; temperature 
variations. 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE 
Improperly designed or purchased for operation. Example: cable length - cable can 
be run too far or a poorly-manufactured version may be substituted for one of higher 
quality. This is commonly known as the "just as good" syndrome. 
MANUFACTURING FAILURE 
The wire or cable was incorrectly manufactured, incorrectly labeled, or incorrectly 
tested. Cable failures of this kind mayor may not be apparent to the designer, 
purchaser or installer. 
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NASA's Approach 
Goal: Develop a next generation wire where 
insulation and/or core damage can be 
detected on a powered wire. 
• NASA has developed a fault detection wire technology that is ready to be shared with 
prospective users. 
• Thermax, as part of Space Act Agreement KCA-4247 revA, is a manufacturing 
partner with the goal of commercializing the technology. 
Status: Multiple samples have been developed and 
evaluated. The technology is now at a point 
that end user involvement is needed to 
continue development and commercialization. 
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Materials examined during development of detection layer 
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• Nickel coated carbon fiber 
• Conductive carbon cloth 
• Metallized mylar tapes 
• Sputter coated metals 
• Electroplated metals 
• Printed-on conductive inks 
• Inherently conductive polymers 
Tape wrapped Cu/Mylar foil on 
RG316 
Po entia' 
Damage 
Sites 
Cross section of RG316 wire with 
Cu foil and PTFE jacket 
Extruded FEP on Cu foil 
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Wire Analysis 
TDR Desktop Testing Setup 
--r .......... --..... __ 
100% Damage 0% Damage 
75% Damilge 
Damage profile for TOR testing 
SWR Desktop Testing Setup 
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Wire Construction 
Copper/Mylar® 
Core: RG316 Hookup Wire 
Conductive Layer: CopperiMylar® Tape 
Outer Insulation : Extruded FEP 
Conductive Layer Overlap: ~50% 
Resistance of Detection Layer: 0.11 Q /Ft 
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Results 
Two different lengths of this construction were 
evaluated: 37 feet and 8 feet. 75% damage to the 
detection layer was observable at both lengths. 
Damage less than 75 % was not observable for the 
lengths eva luated. 
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Wire Construction 
Copper/Mylar® 
Core: RG3 16 Hookup Wire 
Conductive Layer: Copper/Mylar® Tape 
Outer Insu lation: Extruded FEP 
Conductive Layer Overlap: - 25% 
Resistance of Detection Layer: 0.09 Q/Ft 
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Results 
Two different lengths of thi s construction were 
evaluated: 15 1 feet and 8 feet. 100% damage to the 
detection layer was observable for both lengths 
evaluated. Damage less than 100% was not 
observable for the lengths evaluated. 
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Wi re Construction 
Copper Foil 
Core: RG3 16 Hookup Wire 
Conductive Layer: Copper Foi l 
Outer lnsul ation: Extruded FEP 
Conductive Layer Overlap: ~25% 
Resistance of Detection Layer: 0.04 QfFt 
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Results 
Four different lengths of th is construction were 
evaluated : 400 feet, 190 feet, J 00 feet , and 20 feet. 
J 00% damage to the detection layer was observable 
at 190 feet , 100 feet, and 20 feet. 75% damage to 
the detection layer was observable at 400 feet. 
Damage less than 75% was not observable for the 
lengths eva luated. 
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Wire Construction Resul ts 
62% Nickel-Coated Carbon Fiber Two different lengths of this construction were 
Core: RG316 Hookup Wire evaluated: 197 feet and 8 feet. 50% damage to the 
Conductive Layer: 62% Nickel-Coated Carbon detection layer was observable for both lengths 
Fiber eva luated. Damage less than 50% was not 
Outer Insulation : PTFE Tape, Sintered observable for the lengths eva luated. 
Conductive Layer Overlap: - 0% 
Resistance of Detection Layer: 0.30 .ofFt 
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In-line Connectors 
X-ray image of miniaturized 
2nd generation TOR 
connector 
2nd and 3rd generation designs provide in-line 
vehicle health monitoring 
Patent Application #s 12/843353, 12/843382, 12/843487 
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Testing of new wire construction using in-line TDR. 
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Differential data for in-line TDR testing of new wire construction. 
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NASA is seeking collaborators, vehicle 
designers, and end users for specific 
application needs. 
Thermax can manufacture tailored wire 
constructions for end-user applications. 
End-users can test damage detection 
systems in real-time applications. 
NASA is seeking connector companies to 
license and build in-line TOR connector 
technology. NASA proposed funding in 
FY12-14 may help subsidize technology 
transfer costs. 
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KSC Wire Diagnostics System 
Technology Transfer and 
Partnership Strategic Plan 
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SHORTWATCH 
' PRED I CT I VE WIRE - FAILURE ' 
TECHNOLOGY I N TUFFl ITE ® 2000 
CABLE JACKET 
L SILVER COATED COPPER STRIP 
• Silver-coated copper strips didn't provide uniform 
coverage across entire area. 
• Thickness and weight of strips+insulation increased 
volume and weight above design requirements 
• New construction provides detection for multiple 
damages. 
